漏洞简述：A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achievea successful decryption an attacker would havetobe ableto send a very large numberof trial messages for decryption.The vulnerability affectsallRSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, ina TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-mastersecretto the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use thisflaw to send trialmessages to the server and record the timetaken to process them. After a sufficiently largenumber of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the originalconnection and thusbe able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve asuccessful decryption an attackerwould have tobeable tosend a very large number oftrial messages fordecryption. Thevulnerability affects allRSApadding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLSconnection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secretto theserver. An attacker that had observed agenuineconnection between a client and a server could use this flaw tosendtrial messagesto the server and record the time taken toprocess them. After asufficiently large number ofmessages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used forthe original connectionand thus be able todecrypt theapplicationdata sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementationwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in aBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attackerwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages fordecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send anencrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed agenuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to sendtrial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After asufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-mastersecret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt theapplication data sent over that connection.
