Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recoveringthe private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation.Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computationscould allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuringthe timing would require either local access to the signing application ora very fast network connection with low latency.There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word ofthe inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significantprobability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particularthe NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attackerprocess must either be located in the same physical computer or musthave a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reasonthe severity of this vulnerability is Low.The FIPS modules in 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are affected by this issue.
Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recoveringthe private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation.Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computationscould allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuringthe timing would require either local access to the signing application ora very fast network connection with low latency.There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word ofthe inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significantprobability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particularthe NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attackerprocess must either be located in the same physical computer or musthave a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reasonthe severity of this vulnerability is Low.The FIPS modules in 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are affected by this issue.
